About the Book

Since Pakistan's birth in 1947 while Islam's role in state-building and identity creation has not been fully delineated and defined, the Military and civilian regimes however have impressively exploited its mass appeal to garner public support and political legitimacy. As a result Islamists have seen a steady rise as a third political force, culminating in Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal's rise to power in North West Frontier Province in 2002. It was unprecedented but not unexpected, as this book argues. The democratic opposition had accused Gen. Pervez Musharraf of establishing this partnership during his presidential referendum in 2002 in which the Military establishment had mobilised several extremist groups to campaign and organise meetings across Pakistan. Such a partnership has thrived time and again accruing political dividends to both sides and at times even at the expense of country's own security and political stability.

The book traces the relationship between the Military and Islamists, herein referred to as the two extremes and examines various measures and acts that resulted since it evolved in 2002. It explains the dynamics of Military-Islamists partnership under Musharraf and how it differed in substance and intent from what featured under Gen. Zia ul Haq. This book is not only about their mutual trust but mistrust as well and illustrates the perils of such an engagement for Pakistan's own stability and security that Musharraf overlooked in his blind pursuit for power. It is a study that helps understand many events and developments that have rocked Pakistan recently.

About Author

Dr. Ashutosh Misra is Research Fellow, Griffith Asia Institute (GAI) and Associate Investigator, Centre of Excellence in Policing and Security (CEPS), Australia. He has extensively written on Pakistan in books, journals and newspapers and holds a PhD on Indo-Pak relations from the Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.

Contents

Preface
Acknowledgements
Abbreviations

Introduction

I. The First Extreme: Military's Rise and Rule in Pakistan
Military's Entry into Politics / 13; Military's Tactical Retreat (1988-93) / 18; Failings of the 'Democrats': Military's Favourite Theme (1993-99) / 19; The Fourth Blow (1999) / 20; The Drivers for Military Intervention /21; Military's Modus Operandi / 32; Military's Corporate Muscle / 38; Conclusion / 43

II. The Second Extreme: Rise and Rumblings of the Islamists
2002 General Elections / 48; Unity of the MMA / 49; Military-ISI-Ulema Linkage / 51; Marginalisation of PPPP and PML-N / 53; 9/11 and the Anti-US Sentiments / 53; Drive Against Madaris / 54; MMA's Political Sagacity and Unity / 55; Committed Cadres and Network / 56; Ideological Bankruptcy of Disjointed Mainstream Parties / 57; MMA's Provincial Strategy / 58; Peoples' Antipathy to General Musharraf's April Referendum / 60; Conclusion / 61

III. MMA and Islamisation: Extreme Measures
Gloves Off Post-Election / 67; Enforcement of Sharia / 68; Hisbah Bill / 68; Legal System / 71; Status of Women / 72; Hudood Ordinance / 73; Registration of Madaris / 77; Passport Controversy over Religion Column / 78; Islamic Banking and Interest-Free Economy / 79; Land Reforms / 80; Educational Reforms / 81; Curbs on Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) / 82; Stoking Anti-US and Anti-West Sentiments / 83; Conclusion / 85

IV. Military-MMA Alliance: Marriage of Convenience
Legal Framework Order (LFO) 2002 / 93; Vote of Confidence in the National Assembly / 96; Twin Hats / 96; National Security Council (NSC) / 98; Local Governments / 100; Differences Over FATA Operations / 102; Locking Horns Over Balochistan Operations / 104; Conclusion / 109

V. Military and the Jihadis: Friends Turned Foes?
Islam-Military Linkage Rationale: Professional or Ideological? / 119; General Muhammad Aziz Khan / 122; Lieutenant General Mehmud Ahmed / 123; Lieutenant General Hamid Gul / 124; Hand in Glove: Army/ISI-Jihadi Relations / 125; JKLF-ISI Linkage / 126; Army-ISI-Taliban Linkage / 126; Army-Taliban: Kunduz Evacuation / 127; Ahmed al-Khadir Episode: ISI's Role / 128; Omar Saeed Sheikh and Daniel Pearl Kidnapping / 128; The Recoil Effect: Army-Jihadis Connivance / 130; Musharraf under Islamists' Influence / 133; The Necessary Evil? / 134; Chasing Al-Qaida, Ignoring the Taliban / 136; Conclusion / 138

Conclusion

Appendices
I : Party Positions in National Assembly (As of June 2004)
II : Party Positions in the Senate (As of February 2003)
III : Major Party Positions in the Provincial Assemblies (As of January 2003)
IV : The MMA Manifesto

References

Index

Additional Info.